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A MAKK TWAINIAN VIEW OF CONSUMER SURPLUS
*
'..V , . George W,. Ladd
January 1981 ' .
The title reflects the fact that'each time- I read one of those
marvelously 'sopliisticated articles on consumer surplus (CS), the thought
occurs to me that I must feel the same way about CS as Mark Twain felt
about science.' In Chapter 17 of Life on the Mississippi he wrote,
"In the'space of one 'hundred and seventy—six years the
Lower Mississippi has shortened itself two hundred and forty-
two miles." That is an average of a trifle over one mile and a
third per year. Therefore, any calm person, who is not blind
or idiotic,' can see that in the Old QKlitic Silurian Period,
just a million years ago next November, the Lower Mississippi
River was upward of one million three hundred thousand miles
long, and stuck out over the Gulf of Mexico like a fishing—rod.
And by the same token any person can see that seven hundred
and forty-two years from now the Lower Mississippi will be only
a mile and three-quarters, long, and Cairo and New Orleans will
have joined their streets together, and be plodding comfortably
along under a single mayor and a mutual board of aldermen.
There is'something fascinating about science. One gets such
wholesome returns of conjecture out of such a trifling invest
ment of fa'ct."
It strikes me that "There is something fascinating about CS analysis
One gets such wholesome returns of conjecture out of such a trifling'
investment of fact."
Many economists have used CS or producer surplus (PS) to evaluate
consequences of public policies. Although some economists question CS
and PS formulations, the proponents of their use have carried the day.
Almost every journal issue carries articles in which they are used. No
one hears from'the opponents any more—except-for an occasional furtive
I am grateful to' Roger Dahlgranj Marvin Hayenga, and John Miranowski' for
their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
whisper, "I don't believe it". For a refreshing exception, see
Cochrane (1980). Cochrane*s objections to use of CS are mostly practical
ones: that use of CS in public policy analysis is an effort to provide
a scalar answer to a question that does not have a scalar answer, and
that measures of CS do not provide public-policy makers information that
they can use in choosing and defending policies. This paper coiiq>lement8
Cochrane*s practical objections by presenting theoretical objections.
The main thesis of this paper is that it is a good thing if Cochrane is
right in asserting that CS is not used in making public policy, because
the concept of CS is seriously flawed and our measures of CS are biased
measures of a flawed concept.
SUMMARY
This paper is not going to review all the literature on and the
evidence for and against use of CS. Currie, Murphy, and Schmitz (1971)
present a useful summary and make it clear that they support the use of
CS and PS. An excellent article by Harberger (1971) argues in favor of
use of CS and PS in public-policy analysis.
The first two sections of this paper present excess utility (EU) and
excess expenditure (EE) definitions, and the third discusses their
equivalence. The fourth section considers empirical evidence on the
model of consumer behavior in which CS is derived. It argues that the
empirical evidence against the model is sufficiently strong that a
person can reasonably conclude that the CS hypotheses should be rejected.
The fifth section concerns definition and measurement of CS. This section
argues that a satisfactory definition of CS requires that three conditions
be satisfied, and*-these three conditions"can not-be satisfied simulta- '
neously and consequently our standard definition of CS contains a ^
serious flaw. This.section concludes that the total area under a
demand function overstates the amount spent by consumers under price
discrimination. The next section concludes that our definition and
measure of PS are subject to similar criticisms. In the seventh
section it is argued that it^is not possible to have nonzero PS and
nonzero CS smultanepusly. The eighth section discusses three value
judgments that are made in measuring CS and using CS in public-policy
analysis and suggests that many economists use measures of CS that
violate their own value systems. The next section discusses standard
errors.of estimates of CS. The final section treats a methodological
issue.
f •'
EXCESS UTILITY (EU) DEFINITION
• .>The notation offBarten*s.(1977) review of studies on systems of
consumer demand equations will be used.because his study will be cited
again later in this paper. Assume that the consumer's preferences, can
be represented by the strictly quasi-concave monotone increasing utility
function
(1) u = u(q)
where q is an n-element vector of quantities. The function u(q) is
continuous and has continuous first- and second-order derivatives with
respect to q. The consumer maximizes u(q). subject to
(2) m - p*q
where m is a fixed scalar, interpreted either as income or as total
expenditure, and p is an n-element column vector of fixed prices. The
first-order conditions are (2) and
(3) du/dq = Ap
where du/dq is the n-element vector 3u/3q^. The solution of (2) and (3)
for q and X in terms of p and m yields the demand equations
(4) q = D(p,m)
Strict quasi-concavity and monotonicity ensure the existence of such a
solution. If (4) has an Inverse, each demand function can be expressed as
Pi " d^Cq^m).
A typical element of (3) is
Su/Sq^ = Ap^
If all other prices and incomes remain constant and marginal utility of
money, X, remains constant, then
x
(5) u - X ^ p^ dq^
a measure of the total amount of utility obtained if good i is consumed in
the amount x. The excess of (6) over total expenditure on amount x is the
consumer surplus, that is
(6) CS SEU -X dq^ -xp^j
Equation (6) provides an EU definition of CS.
One objection to (5) and (6) is that they are based on the assumption
of constant X. Harberger (1971, p. 788 fn. 2) provides one answer to this
objection. If z is the value of a policy variable the change in utility
that results from changing the policy variable from Zq to is
Au
==0 i
Z Uj^(z) (aqj,/3z) dz
5a
"This, being expressed in utils, is not invariant to a monotonic trans-
fomation. However, transforming utility into money> continuously through
the integration process, always at the marginal utility of money prevailing
at that point," yields
(7) Aw =
^1 2 (u^(z)/X(z))(3q^/3z) dz = ^1 Z p.(z)(9q./3z) dz.
z.z.
'0 0
Expression (8) provides an EU definition of CS. Throughout•the rest of
this paper it will be assumed that X is constant, except where otherwise
specified.
EXCESS EXPENDITURES (EE) DEFINITION- • .v.
CS can also be defined in terms of excess consumer expenditure (EE).
Whereas the EU definition applies for an individual consumer," the EE
definition can apply to an. individual .consumer or to a group of- consumers.
Figure 1 is copied from Boulding (1946). He writes (p. 639) "The 'buyers*
curve* .... b^, shows what quantities buyers are just willing to buy at
various prices. Thus; at a price OB^ there are buyers just willing" to
buy at a price ON2, there are buyers just willing to buy an amount
B2b2; and so on. The "total amount that will be bought at the price ON2
is, of course, B^b^ + ^2^2' same principle applies
all the way down the curve, the *buyers' curve' is also the demand curve."
}
On page 640, (italics mine) "Then the total buyers* surplus at the
equilibrium price is measured by the area N^BP The buyers' surplus
measures the difference between the total amount actually paid by the
buyers (ONPM) and the total amount which they would have been willing to
pay if perfect price discrimination could have been practiced—(i.e., if
N,
Pncc
^ |b,
Buyer6
6u^blu5
Sellers
5b
Figure 1.
Source: Bouldlng (1946, p. 641).
Sf* Sm
• .1
each unit had been sold at'the highest price' that anyone was willing to
pay for it)—which would be the area On p. 642 "a fall in price
may not only attract new buyers, but may also encourage each individual
buyer to buy more. This fact is not excluded by Figure 1, where the
buyers ... refer to, quantities, not only individuals. Thus the quantity
^2^2' would just be bought at the price ON^, may represent an
addition to the purchases of existing buyers; and the quantity S2S2
likewise may represent an addition to the sales of existing sellers as
well as the sales of. new sellers." Boulding uses "buyers, surplus" for
what is commonly now called CS.
Also he writes on page 640 (italics mine), "The sellers' surplus
measures the difference between what the sellers actually receive (ONPM)
and the least sum for which the amount OM could be obtained under perfect
price discrimination—i.e., if each quantity were to be paid for at a
rate only just, sufficient to induce the seller to part with it. This is
the area OS^PM." And the area S^NP measures sellers' surplus, or
producers * surplus.
EQUIVALENCE OF THE DEFINITIONS
Currie, Murphy, and Schmitz (1971) assert that"the EU and EE"
definitions are equivalent. In this paper it"is accepted that they are
equivalent (except possibly for the proportionately factor X). Because
EE is. an amount of money and X is constant marginal utility of money,"
.EU - XEE is marginal utility of the amount of money EE, Alternatively,
one can accept Harberger's derivation of (7) and accept'EU = EE. "
EMPIRICAL FOUNDATION - OR LACK THEREOF
Braithwalte (1953, pp. 12-21) classified hypotheses into three
levels. Level I hypotheses are the highest level hypotheses in a system.
They have the greatest generality and serve only as premisses in the
system. Level II hypotheses are less general. They are derived from
level I hypotheses by logical arguments. They occur as conclusions but
also serve as premisses for level III hypotheses, which appear only as
conclusions, A level II hypotheses is a general or universal statement
that yields a great number of level III hypotheses, each of which is a
specific instance of the universal statement. One level II hypothesis
yields hypotheses IXIa, Illb, IIIc, etc. Empirical contradiction of a
level III hypothesis therefore implies rejection of the level II
hypothesis from which it is derived. If, e.g., the level II hypothesis
is "All A*sareB's", an observation of one A that is not a B refutes
the level II hypothesis. And refutation of a level II hypothesis
Implies refutation of the conjunction of level I hypotheses used in
deriving the level II hypothesis.
In the previous section on EU definition, e.g., equation (1) is a
level I hypothesis. Under the level I hypotheses of that section, the
consumer demand functions satisfy four sets of constraints (let dq/dp be
the n X n matrix of derivatives of q with respect to p);
(8) mdq/dm + p* dq/dp • 0: homogeneity
(9) K » dq/dp + q* 3q/3m - K'i symmetry
(10) y* Ky < 0 for all y ^ ap: negativity
(11) p'dq/dp + q' "0; p' 3q/9m •= 1: additivity
Each of these is a level II hypothesis; each Is claimed to hold for all
consumers of all consumer goods at all times. The., statement "Expression
(8) was true for consumers in the United States in 1929-72" is a level III
hypothesis. What•is expression (5)? Because it is a universal statement
derived from level I hypotheses and level III hypotheses caii be derived
from it, it seems to be a level II hypothesis. But the level III, hypotheses
derived from it are unverifiable. We cannot, e.g., confront the statement
"Expression (5) is true for George Ladd's 1980 purchases of Jack Daniels
Whiskey" with empirical information. Evidence for or against (5) must be
indirect evidence taken from the direct evidence bearing on other parts
>
of the system.
Barten (1977) summarized the results from several studies that tested
the constraints ,(8) through (11). Results are presented in Table 1, which
is .a copy of Barten's. table (p. 46). The-homogeneity, symmetry, negativity,
and additivity restrictions were rejected in 4 out of 5, 6 out of 16,
0 out of 4, and 8 out of 11 tests, for a total of 18 rejections out of
36 tests. Half of the tests in Table 1 imply rejection of the conjunction
of level I hypotheses. If one can show that the rejected level II
hypotheses—(8), (9), and (11)—are due to a level I hypotheses.which is
not needed for the derivation of (5), the logical foundation of (5) is
not rejected. But it has not been shown that .(8), (9), and (11) are due
to .a hypothesis'whose elimination leaves (5)-unaffected.. We are
therefore justified in rejecting the conjunction of level I hypotheses
that yields (5) and in concluding' that this rejection eliminates the
logical basis for the existence of CS, and consequently CS is no'longer one
of our analytical tools.' " • .
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Rather than eliminating CS from economicsj we may choose to assert
(3) and (5) as basic,postulates that are self-evidently true. This is
an arbitrary and unappealing•procedure. Its general application would
mean that a hypothesis would never-be rejected. -If it were contradicted
by experience, we would make experience irrelevant to judging it by
asserting it to be self-evidently true and immune'to rejection.
Or one-may'assert that we should:reject the rejections and retain
the levels-I and II-hypotheses, including the CS hypothesis. What . .
arguments can be presented in support of this position? One of the i
weakest is that half of, the tests of (8) through (11) failed to reject
them and a 50 percent success ratio is high*enough to justify"continued
use of (5). Is that what you were taught in" school? That so long as
half of the statistical tests failed to reject a hypothesis, you should
not reject it? Is that what you teach your students? Suppose that you were
about to do'something important, like advise a government agency on
construction of-a dam or bridge, or build a tree-house for your children.
Would you.be satisfied to base your design on a set of physical laws that
lead to hypotheses that had been rejected half of the times that they-:were
tested?
Any test of a set of levelII hypotheses uses auxiliary hypotheses.
In the articles summarized"in" Table 1 the auxiliary hypotheses concerned
r
functional forms of the equations and appropriate estimation procedures.
I
You my argue that the rejections of the level It hypotheses were not due
to their falsity but to errors, in the auxiliary hypotheses, that the
level II hypotheses were rejected because incorrect functional forms or
11
methods of estimation were used. Don't put much faith in this argument
because it can easily be turned on its head to produce the argument that
the reason that level II hypotheses were not rejected was that incorrect
functional forms or methods of estimation were used.
You might argue that the wrong critical levels were used in the
tests and if correct probability levels had been used, few of the level III
h3rpotheses would have been rejected. It is true that the criteria we use
in determining rejection or acceptance can depend upon the use to be made
of a hypothesis and consequently upon the consequences of Type I and
Type II errors. But one can make the same kind of argument to support
the conclusion that use of correct critical levels would have lead to
rejection of more of the level III hypotheses. Braithwaite (1953, p. 172)
writes
"If the use of the hypothesis to us is purely intellectual
(e.g., in the way of organizing hypotheses at a lower level into
a more comprehensive deductive system than that in which they
could otherwise be arranged), we shall wish to reject the
hypothesis unless it fits the observed facts pretty closely.
That is to say, we shall wish to reject the hypothesis if there
is strong evidence against it even if there is quite a moderate
probability of our rejecting it when it is true.... But suppose
that the hypothesis, if it were true, would be of the greatest
practical use to us. It might, for example, be a hypothesis
which, if it were true, would enable a treatment to be developed
for a disease for which no other treatment was known. We should
then not wish to reject the hypothesis unless the evidence
against it was overwhelming; we should not wish to reject it
unless the probability was minute that we should be rejecting
it if it was true..."
In the same vein, Ackoff (1979, p. 102) has written
"Most, if not all, scientific inquiries involve either
testing hypotheses or estimating the values of variables. Both
of these procedures necessarily involve balancing two types of
errors.... Choice of a significance level involves a value
judgment by the scientist about the relative seriousness of these
12
two types of error ... statistical significance is not a
property of data or a hypothesis, but is a consequence of
an implicit or explicit value judgment applied to them."
This means that two persons can be expected to weight the two
types of error differently when differences in their values are
concerned. Confronted by the same theory and data, their different
value systems may lead them to reach different conclusions on rejection
of a hypothesis. Thus one can reasonably take the position, e.g., that
"The evidence supporting the consumer denmnd model is strong enough that
I will use that model for some things, but the evidence in support of
it is not strong enough for me to use it in studies intended to guide
public policy. The consequence of error in the latter studies is so
serious that I want strong confirmation before I am justified in using
the model in studies of public policy."
The discussion of empirical evidence is incomplete because it
considers only the studies summarized by Barten and it ignores the many
studies that have presented demand equations consistent with the
hypothesis that consumer purchases are affected by prices and income.
I am not overlooking those studies but I do not know how to weight
their evidence. Frequently the reported demand equation that is
consistent with the hypothesis is one equation selected from a set or
series of estimated equations several of which are rejected because they
have "wrong signs" or "unexpected results," or are, in other words,
inconsistent with some hypothesis. One can use Clogg's marvelously
descriptive phrase to describe the use made of the theory of consumer
behavior in these studies. The consumer theory is used to tell the
13
investigator "what basket of variables ought to be looked at" (Clogg,
p. 471). The basket of variables contains Income, retail prices, and
perhaps some socio-economic variables. The finding that a few of the
variables can be selected from the basket and manipulated to produce
significant coefficients is not strong evidence in favor of the
level I hypotheses that yielded the level II basket of variables
hypothesis. The coimnon practice of reporting only the "best equations",
Incidentally, raises a question that is relevant to the present
discussion: "Does our empirical work determine the hypotheses that will
be rejected, or does our faith in hypotheses determine the empirical
results that will be rejected?
Actually, at issue here is a fundamental methodological question^^
that most writers on scientific methods and philosophy of science do
not treat satisfactorily. According to them, observation and empirical
work provide homogeneous evidence. Tests either confirm or disconfirm a
hypothesis. If the first, the hypothesis is not rejected, if the latter
it is rejected. What about heterogeneous evidence, when some tests
disconfirm and other tests confirm? How should we then choose whether
to reject or not? And what do we do if two independent tests confirm a
hypothesis but their conjunction refutes the hypothesis? See Salmon
(1973) for discussion of such situations. Salmon also writes (p. 83)
"Empirical scientists have been making observations
and performing experiments in order to test sophisticated
hypotheses ever since the rise of modern science in the 16th
and 17th centuries. When it comes to drawing conclusions
from the results of these observations and experiments, we
are far from having a clear understanding of the kind of
reasoning involved. We are now in a situation analogous to
14
that of mathematics during- the millenniums in which mathe- '
matical proof was used often and with good results while
the logic behind it remained basically mysterious. Current-
work in confirmation theory and inductive logic is attempting
to remedy the situation," '
Until the work on confirmation theory that will remedy the 'situation is
finished, I guess~we will have to muddle through by relying on our"'
scientific taste, intuition, and common sense.
Also at issue here is the meaning of "rejection." "Rejected" can
mean "rejected as being empirically falsified". It can also mean
"rejected as not being the best theory available". The two are not
synonyms. One may reject a theory in the first meaning but refuse to
reject it in the second meaning. One may also reject a theory in the
second meaning but refuse to reject it in the first meaning.
In any event, the main point I wish to make is this: In our
present state of knowledge, the person who objects to use of consumer
surplus to measure gain or utility because he believes that it rests
on unverified or rejected assumptions does have a respectable amount of
empirical work to support his position.
CS DEFINITIONS CONTAIN INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS^^
The contention, of this-- section is that (a) a satisfactory definition
of CS requires that three-conditions be met before"a comparison is made
betwieen consumer expenditures at a 'fixed price and consumer expenditures
under price discrimination, and .(b)"'the three necessary conditions are
also impossible conditions, no more'-than two of- the three conditions can
be satisfied. This contention is certainty anti-traditional, and may even
15
be secular heresy. In order to establish the assertion, it is useful to
start with the very foundation of the concept by listing its basic
components. Because it is accepted here that the EE and EU definitions
are equivalent, establishing the existence of an internal contradition
in one establishes its existence in both. The EE definition will be used.
Elements of A Satisfactory Definition
The components of an EE definition are 13 in number:
• constant price charged consumers when price discrimination
is not practiced,
T " length of time that P is charged,
o c
Q • quantity purchased by consumers during T at P ,
c c c
- total consumer expenditures on during T^,
« minimum price charged during period of price
d iscrImination,
Pjj « maximum price charged during period of price
discrimination, P*. > P >
n m
T^ « length of time period during which price discrimination
is practiced,
« quantity purchased by consumers during T^,
E^ = total consumer expenditures on during T^,
« a relation between T^ and T^,
Rq = a relation between and Q^,
Rg « a relation between E^ and E^.
a relation between P and P
c m
16
Most measurements of CS -are derived from annual demand functions '.and
are referred to as "annual CS". Because I want to relate theory to
empirical work, I will deal with annual CS. My readings of the uses
made of CS and of theoretical treatments lead me' to conclude that a"
satisfactory definition of annual CS specifies
(12) P = P . " •
m c
(13) = 1 year
(14) Qd = •
and computes EE = - E^.
Why "should" a satisfactory definition satisfy (12), (13), and (14)?,
Part of the answer comes from the way CS is used. If P,, >'P « P , CS
Mem'
measures gain in welfare from purchasing Q at P instead of purchasing
c
Q_ at prices above and equal to P . Suppose
c c
p., > P > P . Then CS measures consumer *s gain in welfare from purchasing
Mem
instead of purchasing at prices'above and below P^. The
argument for rejecting P > P is mainly a matter of'convenience"and
m c
neatness. If P^ > P^,'- then CS measures gain in welfare from buying ^
P instead of above P , and one must specify the size of the difference
o c
P - P , and the size of CS varies with this difference. (My criticisms
m c , . .
will still be valid if we allow P > P ,)
m _ c
If (12) and (14) are satisfied and (13) is not (say > T^ = 1 year),
CS measures gain in welfare from consuming quantity Q in one year instead
of having to spread consumption of Q. over, say, 18 months. If this is a
meaningful measure of annual welfare, then a meaningful measure of annual
GNP is obtained by adding one year of consumer expenditures, 15 months of
17
government expenditures, and 18 months of investment expenditures.
Evidence that (lA) is satisfied in present definitions is clearly seen
in expressions (5) and (6). The range of integration is zero to x
and the second term in (6) equals expenditures on quantity x at the
constant price p. . Suppose (12) and (13) are satisfied and (14) is
not (say < Q^). CS then measures consumers gain in welfare from
purchasing Q in one year at P instead of purchasing the smaller
c o
quantity in one year at higher prices. It measures the utility of
goods whose consumption is foregone if price discrimination is practiced.
It measures
X
U dq -
0 ^
fy
U. dq
0 ^
where x > y.
The standard treatments of CS seem to satisfy these conditions.
They all assume (12). Some writers explicitly assume (13) and (14);
some explicitly assume one and Implicitly assume the other; but all
writers do assume (13) and (14). And they conclude that
EE « E, - E >0.
d c
The assumptions of these standard treatments are mutually inconsistent
because if (12) is satisfied, (13) and (14) cannot both be satisfied.
This follows intuitively from the existence of a negative slope in the
demand function: If (12) and (13) are satisfied, then satisfaction of
(14) requires that be purchased in one year at price and that an
equal amount be purchased in a year when prices are set at and above P .
18a
But If price is set above for part of the.year and ^ for the
rest of the year, consumer purchases will be smaller than if price is
set P^ all year. Then (14) is not satisfied.
This section will establish four propositions
(PI) If (12) and (13) are satisfied, then < Q^.
(P2) If (12) and (14) are satisfied, then
(P3) If (12) and (13) are satisfied, then the area under the
annual d^and function exceeds annual expenditures on Q^,
(P4) If (12) and (13) are-satisfied, ^ E^.
(PI) and (P2) are not independent; they are alternative ways of describing
the same thing. Because (P,2) can be derived from (PI), (P2) can be
established anytime that (Pi) is established. A consequence of (P3) is
that the area under an annual demand function between two prices over
states the annual EE.
No Contradiction If Demand Functions Vertical
Perhaps the easiest way to approach the discussion is to consider
a situation in which (12), (13), and (14) can be satisfied. In this
situation, the demand functions have an odd property. Panels 2.1 through
2.4 in.Figure 2 present annual demand functions for four groups of
consumers and panel 2.5 presents total annual demand of the five groups.
Price j^is the "entry price" for group i'of consumers, it is the highest
price at which group i buys a finite amount of product; and is the
quantity purchased annually by group" i at and below p^, and q^.
If a perfectly discriminating seller facing the demand functions in
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Figure 2 charges groups 1, 2, 3, and 4 the prices P]^».P2» P3» P4
respectively, for one year, total annual purchases equal and total
annual expenditures equal ^i^i' equals the area bounded by the
line connecting points F-G-H-0 in panel 2.5. Total quantity sold to
groups 1, 2, and 3 at prices p^, P2, and p^ is and their total
expenditures on equal the area-bounded by F-G-Q^-O. The area F-G-I
equals' the EE of consumers in groups 1, 2, and 3 on in one year of
price discrimination over their expenditures on in one year when
p^ is charged all year.
Demonstration of Contradiction
We expect a consumer to increase purchases as price falls below his
entry price. The demand functions in Figure 2 violate this expectation.
But the demand functions in the first three panels of Figure 3 do satisfy
this expectation. The annual demands for four groups of consumers in
the first four panels of Figure 3 are constructed so that their
total—in panel 2.5—is the same as the total in Figure 2. In Figure 3,
as. in Figure 2, p^ is the annual entry price for group i. Other
symbols are defined as follows
^ii ^ quantity purchased yearly at p^ by consumer group i,
~ quantity purchased annually at p^ by group j for i > j,
Aq.. = q.. - q. 1 .^ij ^ij ^1-1,J
Thus, for example, q^^ equals quantity purchased in one year at p^ by
consumers in group one; ^21 equals quantity purchased in one year at p2
by consumers in group one; and = ^21 ~ *^11* Note that q_ = 0 for i < j
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so that qQ^ = " ^23 " ^34 " ^*^ii " ^ii'
consxnners in a group have exactly the same annual demand functions. Also
assume that there is no seasonal variation in demand so that quantity
sold in fraction f of a year at price p. equals f multiplied, by the
quantity sold in one year at price p^.
If the seller facing' the demands in Figure 3 charges p^ to each
group of consumers for one year, their total quantity of purchases equals
and their total annual- expenditures equal the area bounded
by i-G-H-0 in panel 3.5. Now suppose that the seller discriminates in
exactly the same way that the seller in Figure 2 discriminated: by
charging groups 1, 2, 3, and Athe prices p^, P2, p^j P4 respectively
for one year. Then total annual volume of sales to all four groups is
^i=l *^ii ~ ^2 ^ ^^4* Thus, proposition (PI) is established.
Figure 3 shows another noteworthy inequality. Total annual volume
3
of sales to groups (1), (2), and (3) equals Q2 ^ ^3" Total
3
annual expenditures by groups 1, 2, and 3 are ® area bounded
by F-K-L-M-N-Q2-O < area bounded by F-G-Q^-I. Also, total annual
expenditures by all four groups equal area bounded by F-K-L-M-N-P-Q^-O <
area bounded byF-G-H-O. Thus, the area under the annual demand
function between zero and p^ exceeds total expenditures during a year
of price discrimination. This demonstrates (P.3) •
The argument can easily be .extended to more than -four prices and
more than four groups of consumers. Let there be n groups and suppose
that p^ is charged to every group all.year long. Then total quantity
sold during, the year to group j of consumers equals
21
(15) tqj(n) -
and total quantity sold to all consumers during the year equals
(") tqj(n) = (q^j + Aq^) - Aq^^ = q^^
Now assume that for each j = 1, 2, ..., n is charged all year to
group j of consumers and p^ >p^ for j <n. Then total quantity sold
to consumers in group j during the yeeu: equals
(17) tq^(j) " q^^ « • ^1 ^*^lj
and
(18) t<lj(j) < tqj(n).
Total quantity sold to all consumers during this year of Inter-personal
price discrimination equals
(19)
And, from (18)
(20) tqj(j) <2jtqj(n)
t1j(j) equals and tq^(n) equals Q^. Expressions (18) and (20)
therefore establish proposition (PI).
Intra-personal price discrimination, in which a seller charges the
same customer group different prices at different times during the year,
is also possible. A complete analysis must consider both inter-* and
intra-personal price discrimination. Assume that the seller practices
perfect inter- and Intra-personal price discrimination. Because the
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time period being considered is; one 'year , it jfollows^ that each -.price - ^
that is charged a group must be charged to the group for less tha.n a
year. For i ^ j let . ,
f., = fraction of year that p^ is charged to group j;
13,., v^
1 > f.. >0; fy. = 1
The discriminating seller charges different prices to a group of -
consumers at different times. - He may/also charge different,prices .to
different, groups at the same time.
If p. is charged to group j for one year, amount
purchased by the group during the year. But when p^ is cha.rged group j
for only f.^ of a year, the amount purchased by the group during f^^
of a year equals f^^ ^^jj' ^j+1 charged group j for
fraction of a year, total purchases by the group during this period equal
f..-, . q. .1 .. After p. has been charged for f., of a year and f,,- .j+l,j ^j+l,j , ",3 . , ^
has" been charged for f.. of a year, total quantity purchased amounts
to f.. Aq.. + f.., . -q.., .. During an.entire year of.intra-personal
Jj Jj J+1»J j+l.J
price discrimination,^total purchases by group j amount to
'lij. 'ij .t'ij. ...
Let w.. be the coefficient of Aq., in this egression. Then
ij ^ij
(21) tq^Cj.n) ? Aq.j . . ,
Now w.. = 2.^. f.. = 1 but for 1 > i w.. = S. . 1.. < 1. Consequently
jj ij . . . i y: ;i>j 'ij ^ . -•
it follows from (15) and (21) that
(22) tq^(j,n) < tq^ (n)
and hence proposition (PI) is established for intra-personal price
discrimination. When intra-personal discrimination is practiced all year
23
on all groups of consumers, total quantity sold during the year to all
consumers equals
(23) tqj(j,n) •
It follows from (22) that
(24) tqj(j,n) < tq^Cn)
and (Fl) Is demonstrated for the case of combined inter- and intra-
personal price discrimination.
Area A Biased Measure of CS
It is worth studying further the situation in which (12) and (13)
are satisfied and Q, < Q because it casts light on the meaning (or
a c
rather lack thereof) of the area under the annual demand function. If p
n
is charged all groups all year long, quantity sold to group j of constraers
is tq^(n) in (15) and total annual expenditures by group j equal
(25) te^(n) « p^ tqj(n) " Aq^^
If intra-personal price discrimination is practiced on group j, their
total annual volume is tq^(j,n) in (21) and their total annual expenditures
equal
(26) tej(j,n) - p^ fiq^^
The total area under the annual demand curve of group j equals
(27) tajCl.n) - + ••• Pq Pj
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Because w. < 1 for i > j, it follows from (26) and (27) that
•J •
(28) ta^(j,n) > te^ (j ,n)
That is, the area under each group's annual demand function exceeds the
total expenditures of that group during a year of intra-personal price
discrimination. If inter- and intra-personal price discrimination is
practiced on all groups of consumers for one year, their total quantity
purchased is (23) and their total annual expenditures equal, from (26)
n ,. X r, n(29) te.(J.n) = Pi
The total area under the aggregate (over all groups) annual demand
function equals, from (27)
n(30) TA(l.n) = Pi
And it follows from (28) that
(31) TA(l,n) > Z. te (j,n)
J «
Hence, the area under the aggregate annual demand function exceeds the
total annual expenditures of all consumers during a year of inter- and
intra-personal price discrimination. Expressions (28) and (31) establish
(P3)., From-(25) and (29) because < I for i > j and p '^> P^^ for i < n
it follows that ' ' ' ' ' -
t:e^(n) | te^ (j ,n)
and
, r. te.(n) ^ Z. ^ ^
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That Is, total axmual expenditures under price discrimination may exceed
equal, or fall short of total annual expenditures without price discrimi
nation.
E, J E
d < c
This is (P4).
From the four propositions it follows that the area under the annual
aggregate demand function and above p is a biased measure of a flawed
n
concept. The size of the bias cannot be determined. Its size equals
the difference between (29) and (30). This difference depends upon
values of f^^ and these values are arbitrary (except for 1>f> 0 and
^ij " introduction of the f^^ into the analysis was not,
however, an arbitrary step that can be dispensed with. Their introduction
was necessary in order to use annual demand functions to determine
purchases at various prices during one year of price discrimination.
Cochrane (1980, p. 508) wrote, "The concept of economic surplus is,
for me, an Illusion created by an alternative purchasing procedure that
is nonoperational." This section finds that even if we could make the
alternative purchasing procedure operational, it is an illusion to
think that the perfectly discriminating seller can sell in one year of
price discrimination the same amount that he can sell without price
discrimination and it is an illusion to think that the discriminating
seller can collect in one year of price discrimination an amount of money
equal to the area under the annual demand function.
For convenience my argument has proceeded on the assumption that
each p^ Is an entry price for some group and each group's demand function
26
has a horizontal step-at every p^ 'at and'below its entry price. These
conditions can easily be relaxed. ' If p^ is not an entry'price for any^ •
group of consumers, but a horizontal step occurs-at p^ in some group's
demand functions, set-= 0 for all i and > 0 for all j for
which a step occurs-at-p^.' 'if p^ is an entry price for group i and no
step occurs- at p^ for aiiy other groupi set ="0 3 i*
Willingness to Pay: Time Dimension
The EE definition, in Boulding e.g.,-is in terms of total'amount
consumers would be "willing to pay". But "willingness to pay" must be
. > ' - I. •
qualified to mean "willing to'pay if perfect price discrimination were
practiced." See this qualification in italics in the material quoted
previously from Boulding (1946, p. 640). The results presented here
satisfy this definition because the maximum amount that a perfectly
discriminating seller could squeeze out of his customers was determined.
"Willingness to pay" must also have a quantity and time dimension, the
price that a consumer is willing to pay for a specified quantity depends
upon the length of time that quantity is expected to.last him. And the
price that a consumer is willing to pay in a given length of time depends
upon the quantity supplied. If a consumer is-rationed to three pounds of
pork, the price he is willing to pay is higher if the three pounds is his
*
ration for three iaonths than if it is his-'ration" for ^a week. And the
price he'is willing to pay for pork in one week is less 'if-his ration is
10 pounds of pork in one week than -if it is three pounds.
Conventional treatments of CS ignore the time dimension or the"
quantity dimension or both. They write, e.g., of "the price a consumer
27
Is willing to pay rather than go without." Does "going without" mean
going without for a day, or for a week, or for a month? Does it mean
go without all or go without part? If all, how much is all? If part,
how big a part of how big an all? Actually, I should prefer to dispense
entirely with the phrase "willing to pay" or "willingness". In some
peoples' minds the expression takes on almost a mystical meaning that
turns every consumer purchase from GM or A&P into a combination of
business transaction and charitable contribution. Instead of interpreting
a demand function as showing what a consumer is "willing to do", interpret
it as showing what he does under various circumstances. Remember that
the theory of consumer behavior does not define the vector q in the
utility function and the budget constraint as "quantities consumers are
willing to buy". (Utility depends on what you get, not on what you are
willing to get. If it depended on the latter only, scarcity would be a
much less serious problem than it is.) Consequently, the solution and
the quantity variables in the demand fxinctione are quantities purchased,
not "quantities consumers are willing to purchase."
Key to the Contradiction
The difference between the traditional results on CS and my anti-
traditional results originates in different interpretations of an annual
demand function. Your decision on which argument to accept will be
determined by your choice of interpretation of an annual demand function.
Let us use the group*s annual demand function shown in panel 1 in
Figure 3. Among the messages this function conveys to ae are
28
(32.1) .If is .charged one. year, quantity is purchased that
year ,by. this group.of consumers. phrase "by this
group of consumers" will not be repeated but must be
understood to be a part of each message conveyed.)
(32.2) If p^ is charged for one year, q2j^ is purchased that year
,(32.3) If P^ is charged for a'year, q^^^ is purchased that year
(32..a) If Pg"^ charged for a year, q^^ is purchased that year
It is a property of a demand function that
(32.3) " Exactly'one of the statements (32.1), (32.2), ...,
" (32a) ... is true in any one year
Statement (32.3) is equivalent to the statement
(32.3a) If p^ charged for ^ while, then p^ is charged for a while
longer,' and finally p^ is charged for the rest of the year,
therT"quantity q^^ + purchased that year.
One message'the d^and'function conveys to protogonists of CS,
apparently is
(33y If p'j^ is charged for a time, then is charged, then p^ is
charged, the total quantity purchased at these prices is
*^11 ^ ^^21 '^^ 31'
An annual demand function cannot provide this information because such a
demand function provides information during a specified length of time
whereas (33) describes behavior during some unspecified length of time.
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The length of the time period that Is Inplied by discuaslona of annual
CS la a year. Thus the CS protagonists obtain from the annual demand
ftmction the message
(34) If p^ is charged fraction of a year, is charged for
fraction and p^ for fraction f^^ (f^^ + + f^^ 1),
then is sold that year (where q^^^ + Aq2j^ +
- quantity sold in one year that p^)-
Now (34) is not equivalent to (32.3a) and it is not equivalent to the
conjunction of (32,1), (32.2), and (32.3). It is a contradiction of
these. It is a contradiction unless the demand function is multi-valued
so that each quantity is taken in a year at two or more yearly prices.
My study of economists' discussions of the data and procedures that
they use to estimate annual demand functions and study of their estimated
demand functions—whether obtained from aggregate data or individual
household data, whether from time series or cross-section data, whether
from secondary data, from samples, or from experimental designs—convince
me that these demand functions are intended to, and do, convey the
kind of information in (32.1), (32.2), ..., (32.a), (32.3a). This is the
kind of information the authors intend for them to provide because that
kind is consistent with demand theory. I cannot imagine how to design an
experiment that will provide a demand having interpretations like (34).
Such a function may be conceptually possible and such a design may exist.
But as yet no one has developed such a design or estimated such a function,
nor determined how to use the function In analyses other than CS analyses.
How can such a demand function be used to predict annual purchases at one
price?
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Looking at some other Information that (32,1), (32.2), (32.3)
convey to me may clarify my reasons for rejecting (34) . Set ~ ^*^21^*^21
If price is set at P2 for a year, ^21 purchased, r If price is set at
p2 for f2j^ of a year, quantity £21 ^21 ^ ^*^21 purchased. (In panel 3.1,
^^21^^21 ~ price is set at p2 for half d year, the quantity.
j"vr; : • .•C-.C !'> •. "
purchased equals 0.5 <12^ = ^^21'^ ^31 ° ^^31^^31' price is set at p^
for f^^ fraction of a year, quantity purchased eqiiafs-at* p '^. Therefore
b- :
(35) If price is set at p^ for one year, then reduced to p2 for
fraction of a year, then reduced to p^ for f^^ of a year,
during the period of (1 + + ^3^^) years the quantity
purchased equals q^^^^ + ^<123^ ^^31*
Note that (32.3a)' arid'^(35) simply "^restate proposition (P3)" and are inconsistent
with (34).
Let "orex" mean "or" in the exclusive sense of "one or another, but
not all" so that in a list of statements connected by "orex", exactly one
is true. Then my argument, can jbe,briefly-siunmarized.j 1^maintain that,
the information cqnyeyed, by a demand function.is• k. . ' 5 - / r .-
(35.1) ' If p^ is -charged, q^ is- purchased', - - ^
orex
(35.2) If p2 is charged, q^ is'p^^ ' '
(35.3) If p^ 'is^ charged j q^ "**^*^21 **"^^3i *131)purchased,
• J'-- :• . - ••orex' ' ., -' > v..,
(35.i) If p^ is charged, q^ + t ^^11% ^il^
purchased»
orex
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CS analyses Interpret a demand function as telling something quite
different. They Interpret a demand function as saying:
(36.1) If p^ is charged, q^ is purchased»
and
(36.2) If P2 is charged after p^^, Aq2j^ additional is purchased,
and
(36.1) If p^ is charged next, additional is purchased,
and
Your acceptance of the criticisms embodied in propositions (Fl)
through (P4) depends upon your acceptance of statements (35.1) as the
proper interpretation of a demand function. If, however, you accept
statements (36.1) as the proper interpretation, please answer this
question for me. Assume the function in the first panel of Figure 3
is an annual demand function. If quantity q^^ is to be sold in one
year and prices p^^, ^2* P3) P4 charged, for how long must
each price be charged? Acceptance of statements (36.1) seems to interpret
the annual demand function as a relation between quantity sold duriJig a
year and the min^mtim (and last) price charged that year.
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Stepped Demand Function- ' ,
Is it possible that the anti-traditional nature of my results is
due to incorrect use of finite price and quantity changes along a
stepped demand function instead of infinitesimal changes along a correct
smooth demand function? The assumption'that a stepped demand function
is incorrect and a smooth'demand''function is correct^ is a wrong
assumption. Smoothness of demand functions is not something that the
world imposes on us; we impose it on the world for our convenience. A
demand function is a stepped function because price is not a continuous
variable. Price differences commonly amount to at least one cent.
What, about 3 cans for $1.00 versus 3 for 99^. Even here the per-can
price-difference is finite:. .1/3 cent.- Small, certainly; but finite'.
The argument in this paper did not specify the differences between
successive prices. We can assume them to.-be a quarter or even a tenth
of a cent: small, but finite differences.. Because .price is,,not?a -
continuous variable, a correct analysis can be carried out with a.,-,
stepped demand function and finite differences. ••. -
This argument amounts to asserting that the integrals in (5) and
(7) are approximations to the area under a stepped function. Whereas
in integral calculus we learn that,the area-under a smooth function is •
accurately measured b^ an integral and can be approximated by the area-
under a stepped ;^unction; the argument,here is the reverse of that.,
The integrals in (5) and (7) are approximations .to the area:under- a. - .
stepped function.
If discontinuous price is not enough to convince you, observe that
quantities are also discontinuous variables for most products. Milk,
I'-*', >,*
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beer, pop are purchased by the can or bottle or keg, not by the drop.
Com flakes are bought by the box, not by the flake, etc. Even
products that come from the farm in continuous units are measured in
discontinuous units. A lot of hogs may weigh 22,lA9.143+e pounds, but
that Is not the way weight is reported. Number of bushels of grain is
a continuous variable but weights and volumes of grain are measured in
finite units.
Suppose that, for convenience, one chose to work with a smooth
annual demand function. Then consider how (5) or (7) is applied.
From the annual demand function; we compute q^, and dq^, where
« annual volume of consumer purchases at p^
dq^^ " - *^l-e excess of annual sales at price p^,
over annual sales at price ~
If we are computing the amount of CS enjoyed by a consumer during one
year then each of the various prices must be charged for less than one
year. If each price is charged for a "month," we should not use values
of dq^ in the integral but should use, say, dv^ where
v^ » volume of purchases during one month at price p^
dVi -
dv^ « money value of purchases in one month
Clearly v^ and dv^ cannot be read directly from an annual demand function.
If the year has mmonths, then v^ « and dv^ • dq^/m. To obtain annual
CS, we should use the monthly demands and evaluate
:'V
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There remains the question: "What,should;be the value of x? Should it
be the quantity purchased during 12 months of constant price or :the
smaller quantity purchased during a year of price discrimination?"
PS Definitions-Also..Internally Contradictor
Propositions (PI), ,(P2), and (P4), and a proposition analogous to
(P3) can be derived for PS by redefinition of symbols used to study CS.
P^, and Pj^ now represent prices paid to suppliers; _P^ and are "
maximum and .minimum prices paid to suppliers during price discrimination:
and represent quantities supplied, and T^ and T^ represent lengths ,
of time per,iods that prices are received by sellers. and now-
represent amounts of money received by suppliers. A satisfactory
definition satisfies (12), (13), and^ (14). Let , . .
.p^ = entryprice of group-.i .of suppliers,-i.e.,, the lowest-,
price at which group i supplies a finite amount;
Pi < P2 < < P„ •
q^^ = quantity supplied annually at p^ byrgroup j-
f^^ = fraction of year that paid to group j.
Then the preceding analysis establishes (PI), (P2), (P4) and (P5).
(P5) If (12) and (13) , are sa,tisfied, then the area under the
annual supply.function exceeds annual receipts from Q^.
A consequence of (P5) is that the area above the annual supply function •
and below p understates annual excess.revenues.-
Analysis of PS probably should allow-s.easonal variation in supply.
This can be done, by making the notation and the a,lgebra more complicated •
without affecting the conclusions. Simply introduce seasonal supply
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functions and add a seasonal subscript. Then f,. equals proportion
lj8
of season s that p Is paid to producers In group J and q.. equals
1 ij s
the quantity supplied at p^ by group j In season s.
NONZERO PS OR NONZERO CS, BUT NOT BOTH
The argument of this section supports the argument of the previous
section—that areas or Integrals obtained from annual demand and annual
supply functions do not measure annual CS and PS—and also concludes
that excess buyer receipts and excess consumer expenditures cannot
exist simultaneously.
Notice what was done In the discussion of Figures 1 and 3. To
derive the existence of CS It was assianed that (al) sellers are priced-
making perfect discriminators and (bl) buyers are price takers. To
derive the existence of PS, It was assumed that (a2) sellers are price
takers and (b2) buyers are price making discriminators. Notice that
assumptions (al) and (a2) are contradictory, as are (bl) and (b2). In
any one year in which (al) and (bl) are satisfied, conditions (a2) and
(b2) cannot be, and vice versa. It is impossible to satisfy the
conditions that Justify EE or EU and simultaneously to satisfy the
conditions that justify the existcince of excess receipts. We can have
one or the other set of conditions satisfied in any one year, but cannot
have both sets satisfied simultaneously. It is not legitimate to have
either the buyer or the seller be simultaneously a price maker and a
price taker. It is wicked methodology to assume contradictory things in
the same argument.
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It may be argued that (al), (a2)(bl) , and (b2) are wrong and
that the phrase "are willing to" should be inserted into each one
between "sellers are" (or "buyers are") and "price." The modified
(al) and (a2) are still contradictory, as are-the modified (bl) and
(b2). Can a consumer simultaneously be willing to-act as a price-taking
buyer and as a price -discriminating buyer? A sensible consumer will be
willing to behave as one- or the other—whichever-one he perceives as
offering him the greatest advantage—but'not in both ways. Likewise,'a-
supplier will choose the role that offers him the greatest advantage
and will not be willing.,to act in the other role. Therefore, under the
"willing to be" assumption, as under the initial assumption', nonzero
PS and nonzero OS cannot be extracted simultaneously.
VALUE JUDGMENTS
Income Distribution
Harberger (1971, p. 785) wrote, "When evaluating the net benefits
or costs of a given action (project, program, or policy), the costs and .
benefits accruing to each member of the relevant group (e.g., a nation)
should normally be added without regard to the individuals to whom they
accrue." This is a value judgment,,that sounds rather neutral and
probably would be accepted by many. . But some who accept this value
judgment would probably change their minds if they learned that its
application produces the same result as application of. the value .
judgment that "the preferences of a wealthy consumer ought to have a
greater influence on public policy than the preferences of a poor consumer."
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This section argues that our present measures of CS do in fact contain
this latter value judgment. It also argues that every measure of CS
contains a value judgment as to whose preferences should carry more
weight and whose should carry less* and consequently it is impossible to
have a value-free measure of CS.
Assume each individual's demand function to be q - a^ + a^y +SjP
where q, p, and y are the individual's level of purchases, price paid,
and income and a^ > 0 and a2 < 0. Let Zbe the price at which q 0>
Then Z= -(a^ + a^y)/a2.
Let p < Z and CS » area under the demand function
and above p. Then CS •• (Z - p) q/2
CS
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Now consider a simple two-person economy consisting of a low-income
consumer for whom y * m and a high income consumer for whom y • 3m.
The demand functions for these two consumers are then q •• a^ + a^m +
and q = a^ + 3a^m + a^p. Suppose that we have also aggregated the market-
data for this two-person economy and estimated a per capita demand curve.
It will be q * ap + 2a^m + 22?' consumer surplus
38
for the low and high Income consumers and CSA be the per capita consumer
surplus obtained from the per capita demand function. And let Z_ and Z„
L n.
be values of Z for the low and high Income consumers, and let Z be the
A
value of Z computed from the per capita demand function. Then
h' -
*= - (Hq + 2a^m)/a2
Zjj = - (ag + 3a^m)/a2
At any price above and below Z^, CSL - 0, CSA > 0, and CSH > 0; the
low Income consumer enjoys no consumer surplus but the high income
consumer does and according to the per-caplta demand curve, the "typical"
consumer enjoys a consumer surplus. At any price above Z and below Z.
A
each person's weight in the CSA is determined by his income. A rich
consumer receives a positive weight and a poor consumer a zero weight.
This same weighting pattern—more consideration given to a rich than to
a poor consumer—also holds for prices below Z_. If we use (37) to
Xj
compute CSL and CSH and subtract, we find
(38) CSH - CSL = - 4a^m (q^ + a^m)/2a2 > 0
where = value of q for a low income consumer at p. If CSH and CSL
are computed separately and added together, more than half of the economy's
total GS comes from the richest half of the consumers because CSH > CSL,
Suppose we use the per capita demand equation to compute total CS
as 2CSA. It can be shown that
(39) CSH +CSL +a^la.^)n =CSA
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Average CS computed from the two indlvldxial demand curves exceeds CS
2 2computed from the average demand curve by the amount a^m /2a2- Total CS
2 2estimated as 2CSA falls short of total CS by a^m /a2 < 0. Suppose that
all of this difference Is subtracted from CSH, Then
CSH + = CSL - [2aj^m(2qj^ +
or
(40) CSH +a^m^/a2 >CSL
And again it turns out that more than half of the estimated CSA is
contributed by the wealthy half of the consumers.
Whether you compute total CS as CSH + CSL or as 2CSA, the high-
income consumer carries more weight in your computation than the low
income consumer carries. In any study of a commodity having a positive
income elasticity, these two measures of total CS assign greater weight
to a high-income than to a low-income consumer. If you use either of
these measures of CS in a study of a commodity having a positive income
elasticity of demand, you are making the value judgment that the
preferences of a wealthy consumer should count for more than the preferences
of a poor consumer. My perceptions of economists' values lead me to
believe that some economists have used measures of CS that violate their
own systems of values. If the product under study has a negative income
elasticity, of course, use of 2CSA or of CSH + CSL assigns higher weight
to preferences of a low income consumer. And if the product has a zero
income elasticity, use of these measures carries the value judgment that
a consumer with a large value of a (whoever he may be) deserves greater
AO
.consideration than "a consumer having a small-value of a (whoever he may. be).
The analysis can be carried farther to show that use of 2CSA or of CSH
+ CSL on a commodity having a positive income elasticity also carries with
it the value judgiiierit that as the nation's per capita income rises, the
weight 'given to-high income consumers ought'to rise faster than the
weight given to low income consumers. Suppose that each consumer's net
income were 100 X percent higher so that 'the low and -high incomes were
iii (1+X) and 3m (1+A) , A > 0. According to (38), where dm = Am,
•' dCCSH - CSL) = Xm
dm
=- A(8a^ mh/2a^ +'X(CSH - CSL) >0
And according to (40)
d(CSH +a '^m^/a^ - CSL) = 8(CSH + - 3CSL/8m' =
- 2Aa^m ^
where q„ = value of q. at p for a high-income consumer.
H I • • -
And what if we avoid these value judgments by using only low income
consumer's demand functions to compute total CS as 2CSL? Then we are
making the value judgments that every consumer ought to receive the same
weight and the measure for every consumer should equal the CS of the •
low-income consumer. 'There is no value-free way to measure consumer
surplus for a public policy decision. Every measure contains its own
value judgment.
If economists are'going to make value judgments, they should make
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them consciously and not unconsciously, I would prefer, of course, that
they use wy values. And loine would assign higher weight to low- than to
high-income consumers. If he won't use mine, perhaps he ought to use
those of the people expected to use the study or of the people financing
the study or of society in general. Whatever ones he uses, he ought to
describe them in the report of the research.
Harberger (1971) pleaded that the economics profession accept three
basic postulates "as providing a conventional framework for applied
welfare economics", i.e., a framework for use of producer and consumer
surplus* He argued (p. 795) that "the postulates can readily be used to
define a set of policies that characterizes a full optimum." Now,
optimum means no more than "optimum according to the criterion used."
Because every measure of CS Involves a value'judgment, Harberger's "full
optimum" policy is no more than optimim according to the value judgments
incorporated into the measure of CS. Different measures of CS, based
on different value judgments, would lead to different optima.
Do our measures of PS carry the implicit value judgment that each
producer's influence on public policy should be in proportion to his
ownership of specialized resources?
Well Informed Consumer
The use of CS to evaluate public policies carries with it another
value judgment: every consumer is the best judge of his own welfare,
and public policy ought to be based on that precept. I question whether
that value is fully accepted in any culture. It is not universally
accepted in Korth America where there are a nun^er of laws that contradict
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it, for example, laws limiting prescription drugs; laws prohibiting use
of some drugs such as marijuana, cocaine-, heroin; laws prohibiting
prostitution; laws and public campaigns aimed at discouraging
cigarette smoking. "-It is riot even accepted by all-U.S. economists.
Some economists welcomed Lancaster's approach to consumer demand (1966,
1971) because it provided an intellectual justification for their
criticisms of other people's purchase patterns as irrational or inefficient.
Scitovsky (1966, p. 47) wrote
"I should just like to say how much ""T welcome-Professor
Lancaster's new approach to the theory of consumer's demand.
There is'nothing more frustrating than to-watch, and watch-
silently, the stupid way in which some people squander their
money and get little to show for it.... At last I can look
down my nose, without a pang of professional conscience,
upon the sorry mess some people make'of the ndble^art of
spending money. Now I can respect the poor sucker's
sovereignty and^still criticize him 'for -his- inefficiency in
catering to his own sovereign tastes."
The economists who agree with Scitovsky certainly do not accept the value
judgment that every consumer is the best judge of his own welfare.
The model's underlying ideal of a well-informed consuming public, is
certainly not a universally held ideal among businessmen or among public
employees, as Lindblom (1977, pp^ 219, 220) points out.
"Leading corporations succeed in persuading consumers
to buy automobiles with risk of carbon monoxide discharges
into the interior of the passenger'compartmenti pesticides
harmful to those who use.them, children's toys with lead
paint, cosmetics and other drugstore products that do not
perform as claimed, foodstuffs with dangerous additives,
all kinds of goods with hidden or deliberately misstated
credit charges, costly life insurance policies that do not
provide savings that customers think they are arranging for,
flammable rugs and fabrics, and development houses that
quickly require expensive repairs. '
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For many years. Consumers Union has been trying to
compel the U.S. government to release the results of product
tests carried out by U.S. purchasing agents in the course of
buying products for government use. Its failure reveals the
degree to which business rights to protect profitability—
again, the privileged position of business—take precedence
over consxsoers* rights to be inforiMtd about their market
choices."
Businessmen and public employees are part of society and their values do,
and should» affect public policy.
STANDARD ERRORS OF CS
Economists generally report their measures of CS as parameters
rather than as what they actually are, estimates. 1 hazard a guess that
many standard errors of estimated CS would be so large relative to
estimated CS that economists would be reluctant to base policy recommenda
tions on their estimated values of CS. For the linear demand equation,
q " a^ + a^y + the variance of CS can be estimated as
Var (CS) - D'ZD
where
D- OCS/9aQ, 3CS/3a^, acS/Sa^)
9CS/3aQ • - <i/^2
3CS/3a^ -= - yq/a^
SCS/Ba^ - - pq/aj +
Ib
00 ®01 ®02 '
z - ®01 «12
^®02 «12 ®22 1
®ii " '^ '^ i^iance of a^ for i 0, 1, 2
s^j covariance of a^ and a^
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NONSENSE AND SNOBBERY
One line of defense for PS or CS or any abstract argument, is "This
is an extremely complex topic, and its critics don't understand it. If
you could understand it you would believe it." This was used, e.g.,
by Hahn (1973) to defend general equilibrium theory. He accused critics
of general equilibrium theory of inability "to understand what the best
minds in their subject are saying" and wrote "The vulgarizations of
general equilibrium which are the substance of most text-books of
economics are both scientifically and politically harmful. One thing
that can be said on behalf of a defense that accuses critics of
ignorance or Incompetence is that it has a long though not, it seems
to me, honorable—^tradition behind it. Hutchison (1977, pp. 162, 170)
points out that James Mill used the same argument in 1836. And it was
used at least two millenia before that. In Psalms 92:6 appears, 'A
brutish man knoweth notj neither doth a fool understand this."
The meaning of a statement like Hahn's clearly is determined by
the definition of "best minds." (It is clear that people writing text
books did not satisfy Hahn's definition.) It is usually clear from the
paper that the paper's author means by "best minds" the "minds of those
who believe the argument." Ones who don't believe the argument don t
have the best minds. Even if their definition is relaxed to permit
"best minds" to mean "any minds who understand this abstract theory"
whether they believe or not, we don't have to accept the author's
definition. And even if we accept this definition we still don't need
to equate best minds with best scientists. One may believe as Heimann
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and Schumpeter Inter alia do that a good scientist should be in close
touch with reality. In discussing Ricardo*s economics, Heimann (1945,
p. 92) wrote "But we have since [Ricardo's time] come to recognize that
good judgment may be more Important than logical acumen." In evaluating
Ricardo, Schumpeter (1954, p. 473) concludes that a famous Ricardian
theory of profits "is an excellent theory that can never be refuted
and lacks nothing save sense." In his evaluation of the dispute between
Malthus and Ricardo, he wrote (p. 483) that Malthus "was throughout in
the most unenviable position an economist can be in, namely, in the
position of having to defend plain sense against another man's futile
but clever pirouettes."
It's really rather amusing when you stop to think of it.
Psychologists use the word "psychotic" to describe people who are badly
out of touch with reality. Hahn (and others) use the term "best minds
in the profession" to describe economists \rtio are badly out of touch
with economic reality.
And, of course, Hahn*s line of defense overlooks some rather
obvious things. A person may be able to identify nonsense without
understanding it. It may happen that occasionally the defense, "If you
understood it you would believe it" is true. It may also happen that
an honest response to the charge is, "I don't intend to waste my time
trying to understand it. If you really understood the assumptions
and realized how badly they violate reality, you would realize that
its a waste of time to learn it." Another thing Hahn's attitude over
looks is that it may be impious, but it is not bad judgment, to refuse
to worship in a cathedral built upon beach sand.
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sukprise! surprise!
This paper certainly didn't end up as I expected it to. The findings
in the sections on CS Definitions Contain Internal Contradictions, PS
Definitions Internally Contradictory, and Nonzero PS or Nonzero CS
But Not Both came as surprises to me.
These findings are embarrassing because in earlier reports my
colleagues and I presented annual measures of CS. Ladd and Updegraff
(1969) studied some dairy pricing policies and presented measures of
compensating variation. Ladd and Fulelhan (1970) presented measures of
compensating and equivalent variation for meats, beer, and dairy
products•
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FOOTNOTES
—''l use "methodology" in the dictionary sense, as meaning "science
of method, branch of logic dealing with principles of procedure" and
not in the modern depreciated sense of "method or technique". By ray
definition, least squares and two stage least squares, 6.g., are two
methods and not two methodologies.
2/
— I can hardly believe the conclusions reached in this and the next
two sections. I've gone over the argument on many days in many ways
and find no logical fault with it. The question that bothers me is
"If the conclusions are correct, how come no one foimd them before?"
If this section seems long and tedious, I ask your indulgence. The
shocking, anti-traditional, nature of the results makes a thorough
discussion desirable in order that a person may clearly understand my
argument and results and their differences from the standard results on
CS.
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